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The Miracle of the Markets: Identifying key campaign events in the Scottish independence 
referendum using betting odds  
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses campaign dynamics in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum by 
integrating time-stamped polling releases with highly granular evolving price data created 
by online political gambling markets. Our analysis models the relationship between poll 
releases and prices available on a Yes result, allowing us to measure the extent to which the 
release of each new poll represented an informational ‘shock’. We then seek to control for 
polling shocks in order to isolate and analyse the effects of key campaign events; combining 
a multivariate time series analysis with confirmatory testing based on a micro-analysis of the 
movement in gambling prices in the minutes and hours following these events. We conclude 
that the second leaders’ debate between Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling was the most 
influential event of the campaign, initiating a surge in the Yes side’s estimated probability of 
victory. 
Keywords: Campaign dynamics; Scottish independence referendum; Political Gambling.   
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1. Introduction 
The Scottish independence referendum represented a breakthrough in the popularity of 
political betting in the UK (Bienkov, 2014). Prices on the outcome were available from at 
least 17 gambling websites and just one of these, www.betfair.com, reported over £8.6 
million in matched bets on the referendum (Thomas, 2014). This extensive betting activity 
generated information about the likelihood of referendum’s outcome as estimated by 
gamblers while the campaign unfolded. Our aim in this paper is to leverage the dynamic 
nature and high level of temporal granularity provided by political gambling market data in 
order to identify the effects of both emerging polling information and key events on 
outcome likelihoods during the Scottish independence referendum campaign.  
Even a cursory review of the Scottish independence referendum indicates that there was 
considerable in-campaign volatility. While the No camp had a strong initial lead and, 
ultimately, won by a margin of over 10% (Electoral Commission, 2014); in the weeks running 
up to the vote the polls narrowed and there was genuine uncertainty about which side 
would prevail. A shock YouGov poll, released on the evening of September 6 and published 
in 7 September’s Sunday Times, put the Yes option in the lead. The ‘Better Together’ anti-
independence coalition responded to this development with a hyper-active flurry of 
campaigning. The apogee of their rear-guard action was a written commitment to (among 
other things) extensive new powers for the Scottish Parliament signed by David Cameron, 
Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg. ‘The Vow’, as it became known, appeared late in the campaign; 
it was published in the Daily Record on 16 September, 2014. 
As such, it does not seem inappropriate to suggest that the volatility of the Scottish 
independence referendum campaign generated political commitments that will affect the 
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constitutional politics of Great Britain for years to come. In the light of the 2015 UK general 
election result, which saw the SNP securing 56 out of 59 available Scottish seats in 
Westminster, it is also difficult to avoid the conclusion that the campaign altered the face of 
UK electoral politics. Finally, the campaign has relevance to contemporary and potential 
future developments in UK and Scottish politics. Although Alex Salmond famously described 
the 2014 vote as a ‘once in a generation opportunity’, Nicola Sturgeon was quick to assert 
that a second Scottish independence referendum is ‘very much on the table’ following the 
UK’s EU membership referendum on 23 June, 2016. 
All of these considerations point to the substantive importance of understanding how the 
Scottish independence referendum campaign unfolded. More generally, the Scottish 
independence referendum is part of an international trend of increased use of direct 
democracy as a means of resolving constitutional questions in consolidated democracies 
(International IDEA, 2008; Peters, 2016; Scarrow, 2001; 2003). There is growing evidence 
supporting the idea that campaigns exert greater influence over the result of referendums 
than other types of elections (Hobolt, 2009; Laycock, 2013; LeDuc, 2002; de Vreese, 2007; 
de Vreese and Semetko, 2004; Schuk and de Vreese, 2008). This is because role of the 
‘fundamentals’ of partisanship and economic performance can be occluded in referendum 
campaigns by a combination of the complexity of the issues at stake and cue uncertainty. It 
follows that referendums are electoral events characterised by a relative paucity of 
information accounting for the evolution of public preferences. As such, the data and 
techniques developed in this article are particularly apposite for scholars interested in 
better understanding referendum campaigns.  
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However, this doesn’t represent an insurmountable obstacle to the extension of the type of 
data collection and analytic techniques employed in this paper to parliamentary or 
presidential elections. Indeed, a range of papers have already used political gambling 
markets to trace campaign dynamics in presidential and parliamentary elections (Arnesen, 
2011; Forsythe et al., 1998; Shaw and Roberts, 2000; Wolfers and Leigh, 2002). 
Furthermore, there is broad consensus in the contemporary literature around the assertion 
that campaigns can affect the outcomes of parliamentary and presidential elections (see, for 
instance: Arceneaux, 2005; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2009; Campbell, 2000; Holbrook, 1994; 
1996; Johnston et al., 1992; Shaw, 1999; Stevenson and Vavreck, 2000; Vavreck, 2009). 
A growing array of innovations in data collection and analysis has been directed at the 
problem of understanding campaign dynamics in all types of election. For instance, panel 
studies or ‘rolling cross section’ survey designs can provide insights into the movement of 
public opinion during a campaign (Brady et al., 2006). Unfortunately, for most elections, 
including the Scottish independence referendum, publicly available dynamic public opinion 
data is limited to ‘trial heat’ opinion polling conducted at irregular time intervals by a variety 
of polling companies each with their own ‘house’ methodologies. In such cases, Wlezien and 
Erikson (2002: 423) conclude that a definitive analysis of campaign effects ‘seems well-nigh 
impossible’. We wish to explore whether political gambling market data can help to bridge 
this methodological impasse. 
2. Political gambling markets and campaign dynamics  
Political gambling markets are frequently used to forecast election outcomes. The Iowa 
Electronic Markets (IEMs) are the leading source of electoral betting market predictions 
(Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 2007). Analysis of the performance of the IEMs and other political 
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gambling markets has tended to indicate that they can generate forecasts that are at least 
as accurate as, and often more accurate than, forecasts based on polling data - especially 
more than 100 days in advance of the election (Berg et al., 2008). While there are disputes 
as to whether the advantage of markets over polls recedes when polling data is adjusted for 
known biases (see: Erikson and Wlezien, 2008 and Rothschild, 2009 for opposing sides of 
this debate), it is commonly recognised that forecasts arising from political gambling 
markets produce relatively accurate predictions; and this is true even for their historical 
antecedents (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004).  
We contend that political gambling market data can tell us about the shifts in outcome 
likelihoods that take place during a campaign. The simple logic underlying this proposition is 
that if betting markets can provide reasonable forecasts of campaign outcomes at a single 
time point, then their evolution over multiple time points can shed light on campaign 
dynamics. Because of their continuous availability, gambling market prices, if collected 
regularly enough, can be analysed at a very high level of temporal granularity – potentially 
providing greater casual insight into campaign dynamics than polls. Although authors such 
as Berg et al. (2001) acknowledge the dynamic nature of electoral gambling markets, 
campaign dynamic analyses based on price data from such markets have been relatively 
rare. Nonetheless, several authors (Arnesen, 2011; Forsythe et al., 1998; Shaw and Roberts, 
2000; Wolfers and Leigh, 2002) have used data from electoral gambling markets to analyse 
the effects of campaign events.  
The theoretical rationale for analysing shifts in betting prices as an indicator of changes in 
outcome likelihoods is that these shifts reflect the integration into betting markets of new 
information. Shaw and Roberts (ibid.) note that IEM prices co-vary during US presidential 
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campaigns with politically sensitive portfolio returns in US equity markets – indicating that 
gambling market prices can track substantive shifts that take place during campaigns. The 
mechanism that we rely on to ensure that prices aren’t distorted by the ideological leanings 
of the bettors is the financial incentive that is attached to making sure that one’s bet 
reflects the likelihood of an outcome. Forsythe et al.’s
 
(1998) analysis is particularly 
encouraging in this regard – they note that, while there are indeed indications that many 
traders in political gambling markets are influenced by their partisan ideology, a smaller 
group of ‘marginal’ traders operate largely absent of such influences and quickly capitalise 
on any temporary market distortions caused by ideologically-inflated or deflated prices. 
Provided there is a cohort of dispassionate bettors seeking to make money by gambling on 
the referendum, we have reason to believe that price shifts reflect the integration of new 
information that influences the markets’ perception of underlying outcome probabilities, 
rather than shifts in the ideological make-up of the betting population.   
If we are to argue that gambling market price shifts reflect the absorption of fresh political 
information, then we cannot ignore the fact that the most concrete and consistent form of 
new information about outcome likelihoods during election campaigns comes in the form of 
polling data. Our analysis develops a nuanced model of the relationship between gambling 
market and polling data; capturing the variable effects of new polling information on 
political gambling markets. It is logical that such effects are likely to be more or less 
pronounced depending on the extent to which a poll creates an informational ‘shock’ – that 
is the extent to which a new poll release represents a deviation from the markets’ 
anticipated polling value. This modelling approach accords with the theoretical contention 
that poll information should only influence perceived outcome likelihoods to the extent that 
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it represents new information, in the form of a deviation from what could have been 
predicted apriori.  
We seek to analyse event effects by controlling for the variability in our betting market data 
that can be attributed to the release of new polling information. Because polls provide 
direct (if imprecise) information about voting intentions, we anticipate that poll releases will 
account for the lion’s share of variability in betting market prices throughout the course of 
the campaign. What remains in terms of variation, however, is most likely to be attributable 
to the effects of political events.  
3. Identifying key events in the Scottish independence referendum campaign – Deductive 
versus inductive approaches  
In order to conduct our analysis, we have identified several key events that took place 
during the referendum campaign. We used a mixed-methods approach in order to arrive at 
this list. We assumed apriori that the two televised debates between the leaders of the Yes 
and No campaigns (Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling, respectively) could be politically 
influential. In doing so, we follow a long line of researchers who have focused on televised 
leaders’ debates as key campaign moments, particularly in American presidential campaigns 
(Cho and Ha, 2012; Erikson and Wlezien, 2012; Fridkin et al., 2007; Schroeder, 2008). We 
also created a list of events that took place during the campaign on the basis of closely 
following reportage in the British media, on the What Scotland Thinks blog and using Carrell 
et al.’s (2014) review of the campaign. This allowed us to identify a series of potentially 
important events that took place during the statutory referendum period which began on 
30 May, 2014 (Electoral Commission, 2014). These events, and the expected direction of 
their effects, are summarised in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Event timeline for analysis 
Date Event Expected Effect 
Anti-Yes 05 June, 2014 Barack Obama ‘strong and united’ UK remarks 
11 June, 2014 JK Rowling pro-Union donation and statement Anti-Yes 
03 August, 2014 Closing ceremony Glasgow games Pro-Yes 
05 August, 2014 Debate 1 : Salmond Darling Anti-Yes 
13 August, 2014 
 
Salmond announces NHS free as a 
constitutional right in an independent Scotland 
Pro-Yes 
25 August, 2014 Debate 2 : Salmond Darling Pro-Yes 
08 September, 2014 Gordon Brown ‘time table’ speech Anti - Yes 
16 September, 2014 The Vow published in Daily Record Anti-Yes 
17 September, 2014 Gordon Brown 'barnstormer' speech Anti-Yes 
18 September, 2014 Polls Open 
  
In addition to this deductive approach, we also allow for the possibility of inductively 
identifying influential events through our gambling market data. In order to do so we 
produced a ranking of the days on which the most variability in the gambling market data 
was observed when the effects of poll shocks and the events listed above are controlled for. 
We used the distribution of variability across our time series to identify days that fell into 
the top and bottom 5
th
 percentile of unexplained variability. The results of this examination 
are reported in section 5.4.  
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4. Data  
The gambling market data that we analyse come from a mixture of traditional bookmaking 
websites and online gambling exchanges. Traditional bookmakers offer prices on outcomes 
at which customers are invited to place their bets. Prices are initially set on the basis of the 
expert opinion of specialist price-setters, and then adjusted in response to patterns of 
gambling activity. Gambling exchanges act as an intermediary, creating a market where 
bettors can offer prices at which outcomes can be ‘backed’ (bet on) or ‘laid’ (bet against) – 
matching prices where one customer wishes to back and another to lay. Gambling market 
sites display the ‘best’ price at which an outcome can be backed or laid – that is, the price 
where one gambler can immediately be matched to another.  
For each time-point in our series, the prices derived from traditional bookmaking websites 
are the price available for backing the Yes outcome,
1
 while the prices derived from betting 
exchanges represent the ‘best’ price at which a backing bet on Yes  can be matched. Each 
observation is time-stamped. These data were gathered by collecting publicly available 
prices from the betting market comparison website www.oddschecker.com. To achieve this, 
we developed an automated page scraping program that periodically visited the website, 
collected and archived the HTML page source, extracted the relevant market prices and 
stored them in a database. Prices were collected in this way every 15 minutes. We dispose 
of prices (and their first differences) from 17 online gambling markets where betting on the 
                                                          
1
 In the analysis that follows, we use the Yes prices for simplicity of presentation, noting that our findings are 
replicable using the No prices.  
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referendum outcome was available during the 16 weeks of the official campaign, from 30 
May to 17 September, 2014.
2
 
We use the mean price available across all 17 markets as the collective market estimate of 
the underlying probability of each outcome. In order to translate market prices into 
estimates of probabilities, we employ a procedure outlined in Wall et al. (2012) to estimate 
the market-adjusted implied probability. The percentage implied probability for a given set 
of odds can be calculated by firstly representing the odds in the ‘decimal’ format,
3
 then 
dividing this number into 1 and multiplying by 100. Having calculated the implied probability 
for both Yes and No outcomes, we then calculate the ‘market over round’ which is the 
extent to which the sum of implied probabilities exceeds 100%. We then use the following 
formula to generate the ‘market adjusted implied probability’ for the average price on Yes 
at each time point for which the odds were recorded.  
Market	adjusted	implied	probability	 = 	 [Implied	probability/(100	 + 	Market	over	round)] ∗ 100	  (1) 
One of the unique attributes of our data is the large number of time-points for which we 
have observations, with between 85 and 96 observations for each day included in the 
analysis. This permits an extremely fine-grained analysis of how the market responds to 
campaign events. We employ the full range of observations when we turn to the analysis of 
specific events. However, when studying the entire period, we simplify the analysis by 
                                                          
2
 This excludes an 11-day period from 26 June to 6 July during which time, due to a problem with our page-
scraping algorithm, data on betting odds were not collected.  
 
3
 Odds represented in the ‘decimal’ format represent the total amount of pay-out (including stake) that a 
winning bet will pay out, per unit bet. So, for example, odds of 3/1 are represented in decimal format as 4.0 – 
meaning that a £1 bet will return £4 (£3 profit plus £1 stake).  
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aggregating daily market probabilities.
4
 We have a total of 100 daily observations for the 
period in question. Table 2 summarises the distribution of the daily market adjusted implied 
probabilities of a Yes outcome (hereafter referred to as Yes Probability), along with the daily 
changes in Yes Probability. There is considerable variation in Yes Probability during this 
period. The lowest score is 16.06%, recorded on 15 August, 2014; the highest is 33.41%, 
recorded on 7 September, 2014. The lion’s share of the variability in the data occurred late 
in the campaign; with both the biggest increase and decrease occurring during September.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variable Yes Probability 
 Yes Probability Daily change in Yes 
Probability 
N 100 100 
Mean 20.57 -0.02 
Std. Deviation 4.17 1.19 
Min 16.06 -5.85 
Max 33.41 7.39 
 
We also avail of public opinion polling data from a range of companies which ran surveys at 
multiple time points during the campaign. We use a dataset of poll releases downloaded 
from the public opinion analysis site www.whatscotlandthinks.org which contains the poll 
figures, size of sample, company conducting the poll, site and date where the poll was 
published, and dates during which fieldwork took place. We supplement this with 
information on the precise release times of each opinion poll, based on the first published 
online news article that we could find referencing the poll in question. 
 
 
                                                          
4
 We note here that the analyses reported below were repeated using half-daily aggregations, and this did not 
affect the findings.  
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5. Analysis  
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. Firstly, we examine polls from the six companies that 
ran surveys throughout the campaign. This analysis clearly shows that a significant shift 
towards the Yes side took place towards the end of the campaign. However, we note that 
the irregularity of these polls makes it impossible to link this shift to a particular campaign 
event with any degree of certainty. In the second step, we compare opinion polls with 
market prices. This comparison shows that the market prices evolved in a similar way to the 
polls, and that the significant shift toward the Yes camp recorded by the polls at the end of 
August was anticipated by the betting markets. It also shows that the betting markets were 
responsive to polling data. In the third stage of the analysis, we employ a multivariate time-
series model to estimate the effect of campaign events on changes in market prices, while 
controlling for poll shocks. In the final stage, the findings of the multivariate analysis are 
supplemented with a micro-level examination of market movement around specific events 
and remaining unexplained betting market price volatility is examined.   
5.1 Examination of polls 
We begin by examining changes in public opinion as measured by opinion polls. We employ 
data provided by the six companies that ran surveys throughout the campaign.
5
 Figure 1 
graphs poll estimates of support for the Yes and No sides during the official campaign period 
for these 6 companies, with figures for ‘Don’t Knows’ excluded. There is no clear pattern in 
public opinion for much of the period, with the No side maintaining a strong lead across all 
polling companies. However, there is a clear shift in public opinion towards the Yes side 
                                                          
5
 There were also two polls produced by a seventh company (Opinium). We do not report these polls in Figure 
1, as they both took place in the same week and showed the same result. We do, however, include these polls 
below in Figure 2 when we analyse the effect of opinion polls on market prices. 
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towards the end of August. This movement is picked up by most of the polling companies. In 
particular, the first poll published on or after 28 August  by each of Survation, YouGov, TNS, 
ICM and Ipsos Mori recorded a significant (>4%) increase in support for a Yes vote compared 
to the previous poll by that company. Both YouGov and ICM released polls that put the Yes 
side ahead for the first time during this period.   
Figure 1: Support for Yes and No votes reported in polls  
 
In light of the campaign events identified in Table 1, the most likely political event 
connected to this change appears to be the second leaders’ debate, held on 25 August, 
2014. However, this conclusion is highly speculative. Modest increases were already being 
recorded by some polling companies on 15 August, soon after the Salmond announcement 
regarding the NHS. Furthermore, there is a period of eleven days during this crucial period in 
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August during which no polling took place.
6
 We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that 
the surge in support for a Yes vote recorded at the end of August and beginning of 
September actually took place in mid-August.  
5.2 Comparison of polling and gambling market data 
We now turn to a comparison of betting market odds and polling figures. Figure 2 graphs 
the evolution of the Yes Probability variable alongside poll releases showing the percentage 
support for a Yes vote (excluding undecided voters) recorded for each poll released during 
this period. Where more than one poll was released on the same day, we take the average 
score. There are a total of 31 days in which new polls were released.   
Figure 2: Support for Yes vote in polls and market prediction of a Yes vote 
 
                                                          
6
 A poll was released by YouGov on 20 August, but the interviews for this poll were conducted between the 12 
and 15 August.  
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A first point to note is that, while some polls late in the campaign put the Yes result either in 
the lead or within their margin of error, the Yes Probability variable never exceeded 35%. 
Bearing in mind the eventual result, one might say that the markets thus contained a more 
accurate assessment of the outcome likelihood than a naïve reading of the polls would have 
suggested. 
We can examine the trend in the market prices in order to identify the main turning points 
(see: Bry and Boschan, 1971 for a discussion on identifying turning points in a time series). 
There is a pattern of gradual decline in the value of Yes Probability during the early part of 
the campaign, dropping below 17% for the first time on 10 August and staying there until 24 
August. The first turning point occurred on 25 August, when the market assessment of a Yes 
vote began to improve sharply, with nine consecutive days of growth (by far the longest 
period of uninterrupted growth in the series). It is important to note that this happened 
before any noticeable shift is recorded in opinion polls (the first poll showing a notable 
increase in support for a Yes vote during this period is the Survation poll released on 28 
August, 2014). Many of the subsequent sharp increases and decreases in the market prices 
coincided with the release of new opinion polls.  Most notably, there was a dramatic 
increase in Yes Probability on 6 September, coinciding with the release of the first poll (by 
YouGov) to place the Yes side ahead; and there is an equally sharp decline in Yes Probability 
four days later, coinciding with the release of a poll by Survation giving the No side a 
substantial lead. This represents a second turning point in the series, with six of the eight 
days between 10 and 17 September recording a decline in the Yes Probability scores. 
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5.3 Analysis of Changes in Yes Probability 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the movement of betting market prices. 
Following Shaw and Roberts (2000), the dependent variable in this analysis is the daily 
change in market prices rather than the market prices themselves. We adopt this approach 
because the market price series is non-stationary. The non-stationarity of the series is 
evident in Figure 3, and is also confirmed by a unit-root test which shows that the series 
follows a random walk. This finding is intuitively plausible for our data: when market prices 
change in response to new information (such as a campaign event or opinion poll), there is 
no reason to expect to the market to then discard this information and revert back to the 
mean price. In contrast, the daily changes in Yes Probability have a constant mean of 
approximately zero over time.
7
  
The most challenging aspect of this analysis is to model the effect of opinion poll releases on 
market prices. We seek to estimate the market’s expectation of each poll result immediately 
before it is released, so that we can then calculate the extent to which the poll result 
represents a shock to the market.  To do this, it is first necessary to measure the relationship 
between opinion polls and market odds over the course of the campaign. The relationship is 
measured using the market odds on the day after each opinion poll, as these odds have had 
time to adjust to the opinion poll results.  We also allow for the possibility that the market 
takes the source of the opinion poll into account. The relationship between polls and odds is 
estimated as follows: 
                                                          
7
 Daily changes in Yes Probability exhibit increasing variance over time, due to the late volatility that 
characterised the campaign. We capture this increasing variance via a series of independent variables relating 
to the opinion poll shocks, as described below. The Durbin test reported in Table 4 confirms that the models 
we estimate using the changes in Yes Probability do not suffer from significant serial autocorrelation. 
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 !""# = $ + %&'(()#*& + %+,!-./011#+. . . +	%3,!-./016# + 5#   (2) 
where Pollt is the result (in terms of the percentage for Yes, excluding don’t knows) of a poll 
released at time t; Oddst+1 is the value of Yes Probability at midday on the day after the 
release of the poll; and Company 1-Company 6 are dummy variables for each of the six 
polling companies. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3. According to the 
coefficients reported in Table 3, we can say that (for example) the average value of YouGov 
polls when Yes Probability is at 20% is 43.82% (i.e. (20x0.38) + 35.02 + 1.2).  
Table 3: Relationship between market Yes Probability and opinion polls 
 b s.e. p 
Yes Probabilityt+1 0.38 0.09 0.00 
ICM 2.32 1.76 0.20 
IPSOS -1.33 1.62 0.42 
Panelbase 4.17 1.39 0.01 
Survation 3.73 1.80 0.05 
TNS 0.36 1.83 0.85 
Yougov 1.20 1.55 0.45 
Opinium -0.78 2.64 0.77 
Constant 35.02 2.57 0.00 
Adjusted R
2
 0.49 
N 30 
Note: Dependent variable is opinion poll result at time t, expressed as % support for Yes (excluding 
‘Don’t Knows’). 
We use these results to make point estimations of the market’s expectation for each poll, 
using the Yes Probability value available immediately prior to the poll release. Returning to 
the example in the previous paragraph, if we observe a Yes Probability of 20% immediately 
prior to the release of a YouGov poll, the expected poll value is 43.82%. The variable Poll 
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Shock is then simply the observed poll minus the markets’ expected poll value. On days 
where no poll is released, the value of Poll Shock is zero.
8
   
This variable is used as a predictor to explain daily changes in market odds in Table 4. Not all 
poll shocks will have the same effect on the market odds, however. The variable Lead 
Change indicates whether or not the outcome of the poll differed from what was expected 
by the market in terms of which side was ahead.
9
  This is interacted with the variable Poll 
Shock, as we expect the effect of a poll shock to be greater if it is associated with a lead 
change.
10
 The model assumes that effect of a poll shock is absorbed by the market in one 
day. We also ran a version that included a one day lag of the poll shock, but this variable was 
not significant. Clearly, the market reacts very quickly to new information from opinion 
polls.  
Model 1 in Table 4 shows the effect of poll shocks on daily changes in market prices. The 
adjusted R-squared for the model is 0.73, which demonstrates that opinion poll shocks, 
interacted with the Lead Change variable, explain the majority of variation in betting market 
prices. The coefficients for the variables Poll Shock and Poll Shock*Lead Change tell us that a 
poll result that puts the Yes side 1 point higher than expected by the market leads to an 
increase in the market Yes Probability of 0.19% when the poll result does not represent a 
lead change and 1.25% when the poll result does represent a lead change. 
  
                                                          
8
 While most polls are released by newspapers in the morning, in a number of cases we found evidence of a 
preview appearing online on the evening prior to the official poll release. In these cases, we assume that the 
poll shock has an effect both on the day it was previewed and the day of the official release, and the variable 
Poll Shock takes on the value of the shock for both days. 
9
 There are four observations where this variable takes on a positive value. 
10
 We also ran a model that included an additional interaction for the proximity of the polls release to polling 
day, under the assumption that the market would react more strongly to polls closer to the end of the 
campaign. However, the interaction effect was not significant and we exclude it here. 
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Table 4: Effect of opinion poll shocks and campaign events on daily changes in Yes 
Probability 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 b s.e. p   b s.e. P  
Poll shock 0.19 0.05 0.00   0.16 0.05 0.00  
Lead change -0.21 0.32 0.51   -0.24 0.30 0.43  
Poll shock*Lead Change 1.06 0.09 0.00   1.09 0.09 0.00  
Events:          
Obama      -0.26 0.42 0.54  
Rowling      -0.69 0.42 0.11  
Games      0.40 0.42 0.34  
Debate 1      -0.44 0.43 0.31  
NHS      -0.12 0.42 0.78  
Debate 2      0.93 0.42 0.03  
Brown 1      0.01 0.42 0.97  
Vow      -0.60 0.59 0.31  
Brown 2      -1.31 0.81 0.11  
Constant 0.00 0.06 0.98   0.03 0.06 0.63  
Adjusted R
2 
 0.73     0.76 
N 100     100 
Durbin’s alternative test  
for autocorrelation 
2.51 (p=0.11)     0.57 (p=0.45) 
 
 
In Model 2, we also include a dummy variable for each event listed in Table 1. Each event is 
coded as 1 on the day it occurs and on the following day, and zero otherwise. This two-day 
window is appropriate to capture the effect of campaign events, which depend not only on 
the event itself but also on how the event is interpreted by the media in the immediate 
aftermath. While the coefficients of the effects for most of the events, with the exception of 
the announcement regarding the NHS and Gordon Brown’s first intervention, are in the 
expected direction (see Table 1 for expectations), only the second debate between Salmond 
and Darling has a statistically significant effect on the market prices.   
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5.4 Robustness checks 
The modelling approach described above can only tell us which of a series of events chosen 
by the researcher are likely causes of shifts in market sentiment. It is always possible that an 
event appears to have a significant effect when in fact the shift was caused by something 
else not included in the model. Similarly, it is possible that some of the unexplained 
variation in the market odds were in fact due to events that we have overlooked.  
To address these concerns, we conduct two additional analyses. First, we make use of the 
fine-grained nature of the market data at our disposal to examine the timing of the shifts in 
market odds around particular events. If there was an immediate market response to the 
event, this greatly strengthens our confidence that the event itself was in fact a significant 
factor, and is not merely appearing to be so because we have omitted another important 
event that took place at around the same stage of the campaign. Second, we conduct an 
inductive analysis of the changes in the value of Yes Probability that are not accounted for 
by poll shocks. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the days with the greatest changes 
in market prices not explained by our model, so that we can then search these dates to 
identify any events we may have overlooked. 
Turning first to the micro-analysis of market prices, Figure 3 maps the evolution of Yes 
Probability over 15-minute intervals over the two periods previously identified as turning 
points in the series. Panel A in Figure 3 shows the period around the second debate, from 25 
August to 27 August. Yes Probability hovered around the 17% mark for most of 25 August. 
During the live televised debate, which took place between 8.30pm and 10pm, a small shift 
in the odds is perceptible; and immediately following the end of the debate the odds jump 
sharply, and reach 18% by the end of the day (the highest point since 6 August). The 
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following morning, Yes Probability continues to rise sharply, reaching 18.85% at the end of 
26 August and 19% on 27 August. This is a strong confirmation that the effect of the Debate 
2 variable in Table 4 is not spurious. 
Figure 3: Micro-analysis of significant events 
A. 2
nd
 Debate B. Final week of campaign 
Panel B in Figure 3 plots the final week of the campaign, from 10 September to 17 
September, when there was a sharp decline in the value of Yes Probability. While none of 
the events during this period appeared as significant in Table 4, both the Vow and Gordon 
Brown’s second speech occurred within the same two-day period, so it is possible that one 
of them did have an impact that was not picked up in our model. However, it can be seen 
from Figure 3 that neither event had an obvious impact on market sentiment. There was a 
decline in Yes Probability on 17 September (the day of Brown’s speech), but this change 
took place early on the morning, while the speech was delivered at noon.   By far the largest 
change in Yes Probability during this period occurred following the publication of the 
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Survation poll at 6pm on the evening of the 10 September. Our analysis suggests that the 
drop in the value of Yes Probability towards the end of the campaign was not driven by any 
particular campaign event, but rather represents a market correction in response to new 
opinion polls.  
In addition to validating the event effects that were highlighted in Table 4, we also want to 
be sure that we have not overlooked any significant campaign events. Panel A in Figure 4 
plots the daily changes in Yes Probability over time, showing the previously noted increase 
in variation towards the end of the campaign. Panel B plots the residuals, following the 
regression reported in Table 4 (Model 2). This confirms that the vast majority of the 
variation in the daily odds changes, including the increase in variation over time, is 
accounted for by our model. To discover if we overlooked any significant events, we 
identified the tails of the distribution of the residuals – i.e.  the top 5% of price increases and 
the top 5% of price decreases. We conducted further research on the events taking place on 
these 10 days, but failed to find any potentially significant campaign events. The major 
outlier, 2 September, occurred on the day of a YouGov poll that showed an increase for the 
Yes side; we conclude that the jump in the Yes Probability on this day was due to the 
greater-than-expected effect of this poll.  
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Figure 4: Observed and residual changes in Yes Probability  
A. Daily change in value of Yes 
Probability (raw values) 
B. Daily change in Yes Probability 
(residuals) 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the dynamics of the Scottish independence referendum 
campaign using a relatively novel source of data: the odds on offer from an array of online 
bookmakers and betting exchanges. Our analysis suggested that the most substantively 
important source of new information that drives market prices comes in the form of poll 
shocks, which are exacerbated when a poll defies market sentiment as to which side is in 
the lead.  
We were able to identify only one influential political event – the second leaders’ debate. 
This finding is supported by a multivariate time-series analysis, controlling for poll shocks, 
and micro-analysis of market movement in the minutes and hours following this debate. It 
also concurs with Curtice’s (2014) analysis which reports a headline figure from the post-
debate ICM poll of 71% giving Mr Salmond the victory compared to just 29% for Mr Darling 
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(‘Don’t Knows’ excluded). This leaves us with the substantive conclusion that the second 
leaders’ debate was the most influential event of the Scottish independence referendum 
campaign – this appears to have been a moment when the No campaign’s arguments lost 
some of their rhetorical power (perhaps due to the fact that they had been so relentlessly 
repeated during the campaign) and where the Yes campaign gained traction.   
Methodologically, the approach developed here offers considerable advantages to the study 
of campaign event effects, particularly in instances when panel data or rolling cross-section 
surveys are not available. We argue that online gambling markets, when properly combined 
with polling data, offer a fine-grained analytical tool for campaign dynamic analysis. The 
most appealing characteristic of gambling market data is their continual availability; 
gambling market prices can be captured from websites where they are freely available on a 
highly granular timescale. This technological affordance should come as a boon to scholars 
who are interested in understanding the unfolding of electoral campaigns.        
Finally, a question that is of importance for the extension of the research presented here to 
other elections is whether the Scottish independence referendum campaign is qualitatively 
different from other electoral campaigns. Given the above-discussed volatility and high 
levels of political gambling that characterised the Scottish independence referendum 
campaign, it is a case where there is apriori a particularly high likelihood of observing 
campaign dynamics using price data from political gambling markets. As such, our case 
selection follows what Levy (2008: 12) describes as ‘the inverse Sinatra inference—if I 
cannot make it there, I cannot make it anywhere.’ If we had failed to observe polling and 
event-driven dynamics in the case of the Scottish independence referendum, then we would 
have arguably been justified in rejecting the usefulness of the data and analytic techniques 
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deployed in this article. The fact that we did observe such dynamics invites scholars to 
replicate our approach in other electoral settings. 
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